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Abstract This article reflects on the meaning of European federalism. Although
many enthusiasts of European unity have referred to their vision as ‘federalist’,
very little systematic analysis of what European federalism means and implies
has been carried out. The result has been a tendency in the pro-European
debate to identify the federalisation of Europe with the transfer of more and
more powers to the EU level and the eventual creation of a continental state-like
polity. This article argues that such a tendency is not in line with the proper and
historical meaning of federation, a polity whose political and institutional logic is
completely at odds with that of the modern nation state. The latter is charac-
terised by an emphasis on institutional hierarchy, bureaucratic uniformity and
economic controls, while the former encourages institutional competition,
societal diversity and economic openness. This article concludes that embracing
a clearly articulated federalist doctrine could help pro-European forces, most
notably the pro-European right, to recover a sense of purpose and successfully
meet many of the present challenges in European integration.
Keywords Federalism  European integration  Regionalism  UK renegotiation 
Institutional competition  Welfare state
Introduction
An article dealing with the meaning of European federalism may appear
untimely and anachronistic to many contemporary readers. It comes at a
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moment when the European ideal is under great strain, when only a handful of
dreamers still have the temerity to call themselves ‘federalists’, and almost none
of them would dare to do so in public. The EU has been mired for years in an
economic crisis of unusual length and scope, the legitimacy of its institutions is
being questioned and anti-EU forces are on the rise in many countries. Besides,
the claim to be offering a reappraisal of such an important topic may appear
presumptuous, coming as it does after more than 60 years of European
integration and many profound appraisals of this historical process.1
However, very little systematic analysis has been carried out so far on the
meaning of European federalism. This article, far from conclusive and all-
encompassing, is a contribution in the direction of such an analysis. It reflects on
the meaning of European federalism and argues that the values and policies it
implies could offer answers to many contemporary challenges and change the
EU and its member states for the better. The first section deals with the ideals
and institutional structure underpinning federalism. The second sketches the
economic constitution of a federal polity. The third section briefly illustrates how
this federalism can help meet certain contemporary challenges.
The meaning of federalism
Whereas the US founding fathers gathered in Philadelphia to draft the original
constitution of the United States, the European founding fathers never fully
articulated their political vision of an integrated Europe in a constitutional
document. Therefore, the origins of European integration contain no grand
federalising moment comparable to the US Constitutional Convention. European
integration developed as a process for which ‘ever closer union’ and federalism
were simply regulative ideals and not elements of a precise constitutional
blueprint.2 Today, a long way down the path of integration, this ambiguity seems
less and less tenable, as it leaves all pro-Europeans open to the accusation that they
are ultimately struggling to unify the continent within a state-like polity similar to
those that unified the various European nations in previous centuries. Although
many self-styled European federalists would recognise this accusation as faithfully
reflecting their ultimate political aim, such an aim is emphatically not in line with
the proper and historical meaning of federalism. While the modern state posits
itself as a leviathan—the sovereign with ultimate and supreme power over
everything—the most striking feature of a federal polity is the dissolution of
sovereignty within ‘a regime that enables people to be first their own governors’
1 For one of the most insightful, see Weiler (1999).
2 The various reasons that Europe did not have such a federalising moment lie beyond the scope of
this short article. However, it is enough to remind the reader that while American unity was the
product of a war of independence that had federated the 13 colonies against the motherland, the
project of European unity developed in the aftermath of the most savage war ever fought on the old
continent. The psychological and political scars of that war made it impossible for the founding
fathers to envisage anything more than a circumscribed and gradual rapprochement between their
peoples.
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and where ‘minimal emphasis is placed upon command and control’ by public
powers (Ostrom 1991). As one of the foremost scholars of American federalism
poignantly put it, in its deepest sense a federal system of governance means that
the government does not govern, but ‘society governs itself for itself’ (Ostrom
1991).3 At an institutional level, this is accomplished by fragmenting powers
among multiple units of government, each having autonomous existence in its
respective sphere of competence, so that none of them is sovereign, with ultimate
and supreme power over everything. It is reinforced by the principle that all public
powers should be exercised as closely as possible to the individuals who bear their
consequences, so as to ensure not only wide participation and accountability, but
also a wide regulatory competition between the different centres of power.4 Most
importantly, in a proper federal system the role of public powers is only residual,
because the preferred instrument of collective action is not coercive government
intervention, but voluntary (convenantal) agreements among free individuals and
groups. In other words, federalism entails an insistence on individual freedom and
responsibility and an open prejudice against coercive state intervention and in
favour of voluntary cooperation for the solution of collective problems. Arguably,
no federal state survived the centralist forces of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. However, theUnited Stateswere a federationuntil theCivilWar5—when,
tellingly, ‘the US are’ became ‘the US is’—and the Holy Roman Empire at the very
heart of Europe had many federal traits.
If construed as a federation, the EU is now in the position to resurrect a
supranational order where the exclusionary powers of national political
authorities are held in check and the self-governing potential of individuals
and communities is again allowed to flourish. The fear that is playing into the
hands of the EU’s enemies is, of course, that its institutions may want to develop
their own exclusionary powers regardless of local sensitivities and traditions.
Indeed, the ideas of many so-called European federalists do sound worryingly
centralist. Their focus seems much more on transferring powers from the
national to the European level than on returning them to individuals, families
and local communities within a continental federal polity.6 In a truly federal EU,
3 Here Ostrom is quoting from Tocqueville’s (2003) Democracy in America, the first systematic study
of American democracy.
4 EU law recognises a weak version of this principle (the principle of subsidiarity), whereby action at
the EU level is justified when its objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved at the state, regional or
local level, but can rather be better achieved at Union level (See Art. 5 of the Treaty on European
Union).
5 Many traits of federalism as described here were already identified by Alexis de Tocqueville. He
visited the US in the early 1830s, well before the Civil War.
6 Interestingly, those who tend to confuse federalisation with state-making in Europe also tend to be
in favour of wide-ranging government intervention in economic and social life, even if it comes at the
cost of significant coercion. One should not forget that, for example, Altiero Spinelli was a Communist
long before becoming a European ‘federalist’, and that his daughter Barbara Spinelli, another
committed ‘federalist’, was elected a Member of the European Parliament in Italy with the radical left
movement that supported Tsipras as President of the European Commission. Jean Monnet himself
was a technocrat and the Commissioner-General of the French National Planning Board. Most
recently, the French economist Piketty (2014) wrote in favour of a continental federation to
harmonise social legislation and prevent tax competition.
123
European View 87
the common institutions would uphold the shared values of Europe’s civilisation,
guarantee the integrity of the common market, administer both the monetary
policy of the federation and an effective foreign and defence policy, and take
over the few security and welfare obligations necessary to ensure the free
movement of people and to grant equal rights to all citizens. All other functions
would flow back to the member states, harmonisation would be kept to a
minimum and decentralisation of power would be encouraged at all levels, as
would the widest regulatory competition between different administrative units
in the integrated continental space.
The economic constitution of a federal polity
There can be little doubt that a federal polity as I have described it naturally
encourages market openness, economic freedoms and competition between
individuals and firms. This is largely confirmed by the experience of federations.
In the early part of their histories, they were long incapable of enacting wide-
ranging regulations and economic controls at either the central or the state
level.7 When they managed to do so, they either undermined their federalist
fabric towards a more unitary and less polycentric economic order, or wounded
the economic integrity of the federation with discriminatory controls and
regulations at the level of the individual member states (Hayek 1948; Weingast
1995).
Since the Treaty of Rome, the clear commitment to the free movement of
goods, services, capital and persons has created the conditions for the
development of a distinctively federalist economic constitution for the European
project. Such a constitution was then strengthened by conferring on the
European Commission robust powers in the field of competition policy and by
the enshrinement of the principle of mutual recognition in European law by the
European Court of Justice.8 Indeed, it can be argued that the widest possible use
of mutual recognition is the instrument best suited to a federation for opening
markets. Mutual recognition allows multiple standards to exist and compete in
the continental market, with the best among them being selected by consumers,
instead of coming out of the arbitrary decisions of regulators. As a consequence,
it seems in deeper accord with the polycentricity of a federalist economic order
and its insistence on the freedoms of individuals and lower administrative units.
The tendency, evident since the early 1990s, towards large-scale re-regulation at
7 The ‘central’ level refers here to the government of the federation as a whole, while the ‘state’ level
refers to the governments of the different units making up the federation. These are called ‘states’ in
some federations (e.g. the US), but not in others (e.g. Switzerland).
8 The milestone case in this regard was the Cassis de Dijon decision of the European Court of Justice
in 1979. The court stated that Germany’s refusal to admit a French liqueur into its market due to its
insufficient alcohol content was to be viewed as a measure having an effect equivalent to that of
placing quantitative restrictions on imports and, as a consequence, violated the Treaty of Rome. The
Commission subsequently worded the meaning of the judgment as follows: ‘Any product lawfully
produced and marketed in one Member State must, in principle, be admitted to the market of any
other Member State.’
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the EU level to ensure ‘fair’ competition is a serious departure from a federalist
method.
The most formidable challenges to economic federalism in Europe, however,
arguably lie at the national level, where the size and scope of government
inherited from the economic paradigm of the twentieth century welfare state
seems singularly ill-suited to a federal setting. Most Central and Eastern
European countries came out of their economic transitions with slim public
budgets and free market policies. Many Western and Southern European
countries, on the other hand, still have to cope with heavily regulated economies
and high levels of public debt accumulated in the post–Second World War
decades, when more and more personal and social responsibilities were taken
away from individuals and handed over to state bureaucracies. In 1960 total
government spending for the countries that would later make up the EU15 was,
on average, 29 % of GDP. It grew steadily and in 1990 had already reached 50 %
of GDP—half the size of the entire economy (Alesina and Giavazzi 2006). The
recent economic crisis dramatically showed that such high levels of public debt
are incompatible with the working of a decentralised monetary union. Especially,
but not exclusively, among left-leaning politicians and economic pundits, it is
fashionable to contend that pooling national debts and harmonising national
welfare systems at the EU level would rescue ‘the European social model’, which
they believe to be threatened by a ‘fragile’ and decentralised monetary union. In
all fairness, however, more than rescuing the European social model, it would
impose what they construe as the European social model—a model adopted, in
subtly different varieties, by only a sub-group of EU member states—on the
whole continent.9 Apart from being politically impracticable, such a move would
be at odds with the very essence of a federalist order, which is variety and
decentralisation, and implies the utmost respect for national and regional
traditions under a continental framework of openness.
Let me stress at this point that, although there are good reasons to believe
that such decentralised openness requires a drastic reduction in public debt and
in the size of government, it need not force states accustomed to the far-
reaching provision of public services to discontinue it altogether.10 Let me also
mention that nothing in a federal EU would prevent some minimal social
security functions from being administered at the supranational level. Indeed,
there could be a need for it in the area of social benefits paid by an EU member
state to citizens of another, particularly a poorer, state. The issue has given rise to
accusations of ‘welfare tourism’ and has inspired proposals that could
unacceptably limit the free circulation of people (Reho 2014). In future, some
of these benefits could be paid through the EU budget in order to prevent
9 Interestingly, and more in tune with my understanding of European federalism, one author went as
far as to argue that Europe’s social model is its ‘competing institutional variety’ (Wohlgemuth 2008).
10 The exact impact of a federalist economic order on the provision of public services will have to be
assessed in each specific institutional context. Systems of public service provision other than direct
state provision may have to be explored (e.g. school vouchers for education, as opposed to the direct
ownership of schools and the direct hiring of teachers by the state). For an early perspective on more
competitive ways of providing public services see Friedman (1962).
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dangerous challenges to the four freedoms. In spite of these caveats, however,
the central message is clear: if they wish to be part of a federal European order,
member states (both governments and electorates) must be clear about what
this means and implies, and stand ready to reorganise their economic and social
systems accordingly. In the words of Hayek (1948)—the doyen of twentieth-
century liberalism and one of the earliest students of the economic conditions of
supranational federations—the readiness to accept definite limits to the
economic powers of the state ‘will be the acid test of whether we are
intellectually mature for the achievement of suprastate organization’.
Federalism and contemporary policy challenges
I will not claim that the federalism I defend provides some sort of panacea for
the many policy challenges of our age. I am convinced, however, that this
doctrine is in accord with the spirit of the age and could contribute—if it came
to inspire our way of conceiving and pursuing European integration—to solving
many of its challenges. I suspect that its first contribution would be towards a
better articulation of the debate on the future of the EU and, more specifically,
on what it actually means to be pro-European. Vague formulas such as ‘ever
closer union’ and ‘more Europe’ would be given a more precise constitutional
meaning—one that would make it easier to fend off the attacks of Eurosceptics
against alleged attempts to create a European superstate with tentacular
regulatory powers. Furthermore, this vision—which in itself does not have to be
specifically associated with any political force—seems closer in spirit to the
values of the pro-European right than to those of the pro-European left, which is
more inclined to a state-like vision of harmonisation and relative centralisation of
the EU. It can thus help the European centre–right to articulate a European
federalism of its own. It can also contribute to reframing the European debate as
a contest between competing visions of European unity, instead of a fight
between a relatively undifferentiated pro-European mainstream, on the one
hand, and the anti-European forces, on the other.
By fully embracing its federal destiny, the EU would also be in a better
position to cope with the secessionist challenges that are threatening the
integrity of many member states (e.g. Belgium, Italy, Spain and the UK). This is so
for at least two reasons. First, secessionist tendencies are often exacerbated by
the far-reaching regional transfers of modern European welfare states. Since the
logic of openness in a decentralised federation tends to limit the scope of such
centrally managed welfare structures, one of the economic rationales for
secession is weakened.11 Second, while an increase of member countries as a
11 Different levels of economic development and regional transfers have undoubtedly played a
major role in the rise of secessionist movements in Italy and Belgium, and some role in Spain.
Interestingly, awareness that free-market policies can be a welfare-enhancing alternative to secession
is now inspiring the action of some separatist parties in government. The most notable example is
the New Flemish Alliance in Belgium, the dominant force in a centre–right government whose
programme is the most economically reformist that Belgium has seen in decades (Robinson 2014).
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result of secessions would probably put a strain on the present institutional
structure of the EU, it could be more easily accommodated in a proper federal
setting. This is because member states would have much less clout on the very
few issues dealt with at the EU level, and almost complete autonomy on all the
rest, with the only limit to such autonomy being the requirement of openness
and competition.12
The creation of a proper federal structure is also the best way to ensure the
widest possible ‘repatriation’ of powers from the EU to its states and regions.
Therefore, it has the potential to meet some demands of the more Eurosceptic
countries (e.g. the UK) without rejecting the idea that Europe has a supranational
and federal destiny. Indeed, the EU is in many regards more centralised than
most federations in history, and a federal evolution could well reduce its
competences in many fields. For example, no federation has ever controlled the
budgets and economic policies of its constituent units as tightly as the EU
does.13 Under a truly federal framework, these and other powers could probably
be exercised at the state and local level without undermining the stability of the
whole, as they unfortunately do in the present EU.
Finally, as mentioned, economic federalism would drastically reduce the level
of bureaucracy and make our economies much more flexible. Moreover, it would
boost regulatory competition. This has the potential to free for productive
endeavours the wealth of resources now employed in bureaucratic and other
unproductive activities, thus giving Europe a more flexible and resilient
economic constitution for the twenty-first century.
Conclusion
This article has tried to shed light on the meaning of federalism in general and of
European federalism in particular. It has argued that the common tendency to
identify federalisation and state-making in Europe is highly misguided, as the
political and institutional logic of modern nation states is completely at odds
with that of federations. The former are characterised by sovereignty, institu-
tional hierarchy and bureaucratic uniformity; the latter are characterised by the
dissolution of sovereignty, institutional competition and societal diversity. While
one is economically agnostic, and often displays a tendency towards significant
regulation and government intervention, the other has a prejudice against
coercive government intervention and in favour of economic openness. This
12 Incidentally, the same reasoning is applicable to future enlargements. The EU’s ‘enlargement
fatigue’ is also the result of a confederal institutional structure where each new member state adds to
the decision-making costs of the common institutions. Federalisation is therefore imperative to
creating a positive perspective on further enlargements.
13 In the US, which has strayed a fair distance from a proper federalist structure in the direction of
centralisation, it is still unthinkable (and unconstitutional) for the federal government in Washington
to inspect the draft budgetary plans of states and pressure them into adopting ‘sound’ economic
policy measures, as the European Commission does under the new governance of our Economic and
Monetary Union. Some states are very fiscally responsible; others are virtually bankrupt. Tax
harmonisation is equally inconceivable, and tax competition is the rule.
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article has further argued that embracing a clearly articulated federalist doctrine
could help pro-European forces, and especially the pro-European right, to
overcome the present crisis, recover a sense of purpose and prepare to more
confidently meet the challenges of the coming years.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
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